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THE IRONY OF IRONISM: A CRITIQUE OF RORTY’S 
POSTMETAPHYSICAL UTOPIA 
 
Jeffrey Rivera 
 
Abstract    In Richard Rorty‘s work Contingency Irony and 
Solidarity, Rorty attempts to elucidate a mechanism for dealing 
with the public dissent likely to arise from a group of individuals 
he terms ―ironists‖. This mechanism, a strong public/private 
distinction, he hopes will allow for a self proliferating, ever 
progressing liberal utopia. This paper will reject this distinction as 
internally incoherent under its own terms, and will assert that even 
if Rorty‘s distinction is successful, it ultimately attempts to 
proliferate the type of individual we would like to avoid. 
 
 In his book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Richard 
Rorty urges us to rethink our conception of what a liberal society 
should look like, and which values it should hold and promote. 
Rorty claims that our current vision of a liberal society is one that 
is governed by the idea that cruelty, the promotion of suffering, is 
the worst thing that we as liberals do. In addition to this, Rorty 
appeals to the idea that a special kind of suffering, humiliation, for 
a liberal, is an especially bad form of cruelty. Rorty is aware 
however, that the type of individual likely to cause civil unrest and 
humiliation, the unorthodox thinker, is also a potential catalyst for 
political, cultural, scientific and philosophical progress. He is at 
once the liberal hero, an enigmatic poet who makes the world his 
own, but he must also be the villain: the egoist par excellence. 
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Recognizing the danger and importance of such individuals, Rorty 
creates a description of liberalism which might give us the best of 
both worlds; private self creation, as well as public unity and social 
cohesion. In this paper, I will argue that the mechanism that Rorty 
asserts to bridge this gap, the affirmation of a strong public/private 
distinction, will not feasibly do the work which he requires. 
Furthermore, I seek to show that even if this distinction holds up, 
the ironic liberal should not be the type of individual we would like 
to promote in a utopian society.  
 What is an ironist, and why should a liberal society protect 
the autonomy of these individuals? In order to answer this 
question, Rorty appeals to historical change as being a product of 
the evolution of language. Rorty describes the ironist as being 
indebted to a specific historical view, one that will see the strong 
poet, the thinker who re-describes and creates something new, as 
instrumental to intellectual progress. 
The ironist understands that he is born into a specific 
historical juncture. This notion can be equated more or less to the 
existential notion of facticity found in thinkers such as Heidegger 
and Kierkegaard. This is the idea that, with the inception of one‘s 
life, comes a set of specific conditions which relate to and 
characterize that being. For Rorty, the most relevant aspects of 
one‘s facticity seem to be the subject‘s relation to history, and 
specifically historical discourse, and the language games he is 
prone to play given his position within this canon. This is a 
specific contingency which all beings must depart from in order to 
become self-creators.  
The key difference between the ironist and the liberal is 
brought to light with regards to this realization. Whereas the liberal 
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is content to play the current language games and realize his self-
creation through these paradigms, the ironist views his being born 
into a specific paradigm as constraining. He feels that if he is to be 
the strong poet, one who fears his self-creation is merely a replica 
of a past self, he must create a very strong sense of his own 
identity. This cannot be done within the current paradigm because 
it places importance on specific modes of thinking. Rorty shows us 
this in his analysis of the character of specific time periods. For 
instance, if we look at thinkers whom we perceive as being 
particularly influential, we see that they do not merely find or relay 
information in light of the current views on an issue, they seek to 
re-describe the phenomenon under a new sort of view. For instance, 
Einstein‘s theory of relativity does not simply work out some 
inadequacies of Newton‘s theory, it fundamentally re-describes all 
relevant phenomena in a completely different light. It somehow 
makes us see things in a different way and therefore makes things 
new. This is the sort of re-description that the ironist sees as 
important to his self creation.  
 We might use this sort of example to point out another 
important feature of Rorty‘s theory, namely that there are specific 
historical conditions of possibility for the adoption of new 
language games. The first of these is that new descriptions of the 
world are brought about in light of past inconsistencies or 
uselessness of older language games. This might be understood in 
a similar fashion as scientific theory choice. As discourse 
progresses within a subject (slowly, as a product of small 
contingencies), problematics arise within it. For instance, Newton‘s 
theory cannot properly describe phenomena when approaching the 
speed of light. These inconsistencies are typically dealt with by the 
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introduction of ad hoc solutions. Novel re-descriptions remove 
these inconsistencies by creating a new view of the interactions of 
the phenomena at hand. 
It is important to note here that novel descriptions initially 
have no place within a the extant language game, because they are 
not truth candidates within that language game. As they are posited, 
re-descriptions are metaphorical, but have the potential to become 
truth candidates as they are adopted by language users – as those 
language users begin to interpret the world in that particular 
fashion. For Rorty, it is crucial to realize that this process of 
language adoption is not one of the language user‘s rational choice, 
but a process. Since the individual statements of novel language 
games are not truth candidates, the old and new languages are 
adopted not in light of a comparison between the novel and the 
previous descriptions of phenomenon, but by the slow shifting of 
the way particular agents see themselves and describe their world. 
Rorty recognizes that for most (for the non-ironists), the creation 
of an idiosyncratic language is non-essential to their notion of self-
creation and as such, they are not want to change their manner of 
speaking. To put it another way, non-ironists don‘t necessarily see 
themselves as, but inherently are, people who value a form of 
historical continuity. 
This valuing of continuity is also implicit in the liberal‘s 
relationship to what he calls his ―final vocabulary‖. A user‘s final 
vocabulary is constituted by those terms which he uses to relate 
himself, his desires, his goals, and values, to others. A user‘s final 
vocabulary is ―final in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth 
of these words, their user has no noncircular argumentative 
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recourse.‖1 Again, the liberal has no problem using typical 
language games to elucidate his ultimate conception of self. He 
sees the evolution of his final vocabulary as linear.  The ironist that 
Rorty describes, on the other hand, sees particular vocabularies as 
constraining to his notion of self creation, as the ironist is someone 
who cannot simply take the paradigm which was factically 
imposed upon him and proceed from there in self creation. He 
must appropriate and re-describe the past in order to make it his 
own and become a completely idiosyncratic self creation. The 
liberal is content to move forward, while the ironist wishes to 
create an entire new line. He must idiomatically create the taste by 
which he will be judged. If the ironist creates his own vocabulary, 
he has thereby created his own novel system for truth candidacy 
and therefore can see himself as authentically created.  
We might remark that this description of the ironist sounds 
very much like the picture of the ―authentic being‖ described by 
Heidegger or Satre, or Nietzche‘s ―ubermensch‖. Presumably, 
many of us would find the promotion of this type of self creator as 
questionable, as they have been traditionally linked to anti-liberal, 
(and sometime fascist) ideology.  However, Rorty offers a different 
take as to why we should wish to steer clear of the ironist type.  
Rorty describes liberals as those who think that the 
promotion of suffering as the worst thing liberals due. Further, 
Rorty describes a special sort of suffering that should be avoided 
within liberal societies: humiliation. Ostensibly, it is a special type 
of suffering for liberals because we, as liberals, are concerned with 
                                                 
1
 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1989), 73. 
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self-creation. Following his linguistic self-narrative view, Rorty‘s 
formulation of humiliation is done in terms of linguistic 
communication. Humiliation is a special sort of suffering in the 
sense that it is a forced shift in one‘s final vocabulary and therefore 
one‘s self creation becomes compromised. Because the ironist is 
ever anxious about the terms in which he describes himself as a 
result of his rejection of objective language choice, and therefore 
truth, Rorty asserts that the ironist is the sort of human being by 
nature who has no respect for the humiliation of others‘ 
vocabularies. He is therefore the villain of the liberal society, while 
at the same time being the catalyst for change and progress.  
What does it mean to humiliate someone linguistically, and 
what are the conditions of possibility for this form of cruelty? As 
we have discussed, Rorty believes that shifts in language are 
products of many small re-descriptions which lead to a shift in 
one‘s final vocabulary. These shifts in vocabularies slowly lead to 
paradigmatic language changes.  Slow language changes are 
normal and covetable, as they are based on the decisions of the 
agent (or groups of agents) and help to inform his self narrative. 
What occurs when we liberals are humiliated, Rorty asserts, is that 
our final vocabulary has been forced to shift, resulting in a major 
challenge to one‘s identity. It is important to note that the ironist is 
immune from this sort of humiliation because they are aware that 
―the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change‖ 
and they are ―always aware of the contingency and fragility of 
their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves.‖2 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 74. 
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Fortunately, Rorty seeks not to promote the ironist, but the 
liberal ironist. The liberal ironist, is an individual who holds fast to 
his ironic values privately, but shows no sign of ironic ideology 
publically. Rorty asserts that the liberal ironist can maintain this 
view because he understands that his, and everyone‘s, language is 
ultimately nothing more than a view informed by contingencies 
which an ironist must continually overcome.  To put this point in 
another fashion, the ironist understands that truth is merely a 
property of a specific language game. He sees that the language 
games we choose to play are based upon contingencies about the 
way the world is, and thus how we see the world. He also 
recognizes that these games shift over time; they are savored or 
spit out by different cultures, political factions and intellectual 
movements. In short they see language and therefore truth evolving, 
and therefore reject the ability to make objective decisions about 
the value of playing any one language game over another. Rorty 
feels that this relativistic position allows a strong enough reason 
for the ironist to affirm a public liberal standpoint, while also 
embracing a commitment to hiding his ironism in the shadows of 
his or her private life.  
It is this mechanism that will allow for his ever-evolving 
flourishing post-metaphysical utopia. Rorty claims that through the 
linguistic evolution the ironist offers, paired with a sense of 
solidarity afforded by his liberal values, we can create a stable 
liberal society full of ironists. Since each of these ironists seeks to 
break with the status quo, Rorty claims we will have more and 
more re-descriptions, and therefore more fuel for future ironists‘ 
self creation.   
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I would like to offer three criticisms here. First, such a 
liberal society has a low potential to be endorsed by the ironist, 
even if he firmly holds that the public/private distinction should be 
enforced. Secondly, the distinction causes the ironist to be an 
almost pitiable character and therefore we should not promote a 
society where ―irony is universal.‖ Lastly, the ironist by becoming 
a liberal destructs too much of what it means to be an ironist, to 
make the label ―ironic liberal‖ plausible.  
First, it seems to me that to force the ironist into affirming a 
particular political conception is antithetical to the idea of the 
ironist. Just because the ironist is ostensibly immune to humiliation 
by means of language (as his final vocabulary is ever in flux), does 
not mean that his language and desires are not limited by the 
holding particular political ideologies. In holding particular 
political doctrines, we are acting antithetical to the idea that the 
ironist is a human being who is ever in flux about his self 
description. By positing a reason to hold liberalist ideals, he is 
further constraining himself. He is more likely to be a mere replica, 
and therefore he might get the sense that his public affirmation of 
liberalism constrains his self narrative. Indeed the ironist does not 
merely mentally gratify his own idiosyncratic language, but seeks 
to use it to describe himself and his desires. If he finds his desires 
are contrary to the desires of liberalism, then he is at a loss to 
express his desires.  
In examining the justification of his liberal ideals, it seems 
to me that these ideals do not stem from the ironist‘s ironic values. 
If the justification for the agent‘s irony comes from the realization 
of the contingency of his final vocabulary, then it seems to me that 
this view cannot inform a liberal viewpoint. Since the ironist thinks 
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it is fatuous to regard his or her final vocabulary as being stable, 
why should the ironist respect the contingent values of others? It 
almost seems like the liberal ironist takes more seriously the ideals 
and values of others, while rejecting and suppressing his own. If 
this is the case, he has no reason to be a liberal, since his self-
creation is merely a secondary concern.  
Furthermore, it seems like the ironist is precisely the type 
of person who would reject the type of justification which Rorty 
believes might inform the ironist‘s decision. The justification given 
for an ironic affirmation of liberal ideals is necessarily an inter-
subjective one. If I, as an ironist, understand that each individual‘s 
views are unimportant, then I may see others as like myself and 
may seek to promote the welfare of others self creation.  This to 
me seems to be antithetical to the sort of view which the ironist 
wishes to pursue in the sense that it seems close to positing an 
objective truth about the intrinsic nature of the self. It is the truth 
that each person‘s self narrative is important to his or her self, but 
recognizes that it is the product of a plethora of contingencies. As 
such we get a tacit appeal to inter-subjective truth when we posit 
the ironist‘s defense of liberalism. This sort of truth positing 
cannot be affirmed by the ironist. 
Another seeming inconsistency within the ironist position 
is that he sees himself as somehow historically privileged. 
Although his view of history has led him to the Nietzschean 
conclusion that any truth about man is necessarily a truth about 
man for a small period of time (perhaps within a given language), 
he still has based this view on a particular conception of history. 
He sees himself as having found some sort of objective truth about 
the ebb and flow of historical paradigms. Not only has he 
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discovered the truth of this assertion, but he lives his life in 
subservience to this fact. His ever changing self narrative, his 
attitudes toward others, are dominated by this realization. This 
seems like the ironist ironically takes his beliefs a bit too seriously, 
and therefore must reject a major tenet of his ironism. 
If the ironist is such that he sees his final vocabulary as 
utterly contingent, what does it matter if he or she has put their 
stamp upon history? It is just something that will be seen as fodder 
for re-description by a future agent. Since the ironist sees his 
facticity governing himself as a bad thing, as something in the way 
of self narrative, why would he want to join in creating a 
potentially entangling factical paradigm for future agents to live 
within? Of course, this fact is unavoidable. If the changing of 
language is a result of many small contingencies, then of course 
every agent who uses a language could possibly (and unbeknownst 
to that agent) contribute to a change in the predominant 
paradigmatic language. Therefore, the intention of the ironist must 
be misplaced. If there is no way of knowing what particular states 
of affairs our thoughts might manifest as a result of discourse, it 
should not be desirable that one language be put in place of 
another. 
This criticism lends itself to the idea of the private 
containment of ironism. Since language for Rorty is a causal 
mechanism, it seems unlikely that private irony can be contained. 
We have no certainty over which statements might or might not 
influence other agents‘ self descriptions. Therefore the affirmation 
of a distinction between public and private asserted is obtuse. For 
instance, as a philosopher, I continually read other philosophers, 
and in doing such an action, simply reading a book, my final 
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vocabulary is under the threat of being affected. Any proposition, 
unbeknownst to me, might be some sort of secret key for 
deconstructing my entire vocabulary.  
This point is echoed in Charles Taylor‘s ―Ethics of 
Authenticity‖. In his own attempt to bring authenticity into the 
liberal sphere, Taylor rejects the premise that authenticity is a 
purely self-created notion. Our familial, social and political 
relationships are instrumental in our personal pursuit of 
authenticity. Taylor recognizes that the culture of authenticity 
within liberal societies is one where the value of self-choice is 
paramount. However, the reality of the situation is that when we 
make choices, we don‘t simply value the choice, we value 
specifically what we choose to defend and its relationship to our 
daily lives. ―On the intimate level, we can see how much an 
original identity needs and is vulnerable to the recognition given or 
withheld by significant others.‖3  Basically, the self creating 
individual cannot atomistically enjoy self creation. He cannot keep 
it private. He must use the external world to validate his language. 
The liberal ironist of course, in his anxiety over the potential 
contamination of the public via his ideals, does not have this option 
open to him. We see that atomism necessarily undermines ironism, 
as that ironism has no means of expressing itself and therefore the 
ironist has no way of seeing his language as useful.  
To say that we must in fact revere the public/private 
distinction in order to protect ironists seems obtuse. Past political 
and intellectual cultures have been far more repressive with 
regards to autonomy. This did not stop any of the past ironists from 
                                                 
3
 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Harvard University Press, 1992) 49. 
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having their work influence future historical paradigms. If the 
ironist has such a strong grasp upon history, how does he need 
protection? This seems to me to raise the suspicion that Rorty is 
not actually concerned with a wariness of the public‘s self 
description being undermined by the ironist, but a protection of the 
ironist from external forces. For if the ironist is such that he is 
disposed to regard his self created vocabulary as ever in flux, what 
reason should the ironist have to be wary of political institutions 
possibly dominating his ends? 
Let us look further at my claim that the ironist cannot 
possibly stop himself from the threat of contaminating public 
liberalism. The sources which cause a language user to adopt 
certain ways of looking at problems, creating his own meaning, 
cannot be intrinsic to the self.  Self creation is entirely a process 
which is co-formed with and projected upon external forces. If one 
wants to reject that any force outside of the self should be used as a 
tool for self creation, then one rejects any possibility of self-
creation. If we are unaware of how languages shape or might shape 
our future language, then how can the ironist save his own final 
vocabulary? Isn‘t his final vocabulary continually barraged by 
external language games? On top of this, the ironist is already 
skittish about his ever changing final vocabularies and self 
perceptions. Given this picture of an ironist, it seems unlikely that 
he might avert the possibility of (even unintentional) humiliation at 
the hands of other language users. What is left for Rorty‘s liberal 
ironist but an ever anxious, hermetic existence? 
However, this is not the kind of life we live. Political and 
social concerns are implicit in the idea of self creation. We do not 
live in some kind of personal vacuum of our own intuitions. Our 
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relationship to others and the world (perhaps also history), is 
important to our definition of self and without these we cannot be 
the ever changing self determiners that Rorty wishes us to be. 
Without conditions of significance, reasons to care about 
something or other, we simply have no criterion with which to 
make choices valuable to us. If we are to accept Rorty‘s paradigm 
of self choice, for your life‘s story to remain untainted, we would 
of course (if possible) have infinite control over our final 
vocabularies, we would reduce the possibility of humiliation. But 
what kind of life would the ironist enjoy? His self narrative would 
consist of pure self created fantasy. It would be trivial without an 
external public to project his ideals upon. Ironically, by having 
infinite power for self assertion and value creation, the ironist 
would have removed his possibility of having such a power.    
The idea that an ironist can live in this way, is of course 
ridiculous. It seems that what Rorty is concerned with is not in 
fact, the firm distinction between public and private spheres, but of 
the protection of the individual‘s self narrative against societal 
commandeering. The purpose of positing the public/private 
distinction in the first place, was an attempt at the reduction of 
humiliation and cruelty: the worst thing liberals do. But it was 
posited in order to protect the general public against the ironist. 
However, what it looks like is that the ironist himself is the one 
which is being protected by the distinction. Since self creation and 
therefore irony, cannot possibly be privatized, anyone and 
everyone is subject to the humiliation of the ironist, (including 
other ironists). In short, there is no guarantee that private irony will 
not ―contaminate‖ the public notion of liberalism: the aversion to 
suffering. In affirming the public private distinction Rorty is not 
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saving the public from the ironist, but the ironist from public 
interference.  
The ironist is also put in a peculiar psychological 
disposition with regard to his work. As we‘ve noted, the ironist is 
such that he regards the relative unimportance of his self creation 
as the basis for his public liberalism. It is hard to see how the 
ironist can see his views as being important to the progression of 
history, but yet as unimportant to others. In fact, doesn‘t the ironist 
wish to influence other, futurally contingent ironists? Because of 
his break with his facticity, he is concerned with the progression of 
history: of specific futural agents‘ potential synthesis with his 
vocabulary.  
These remarks show that the ironist is in fact concerned 
with something external: with his position and relationship to the 
evolution of language and therefore historical paradigms. He 
regards his existence as contingent upon his history, and also as his 
self-creation as relational to this history. 
We might ask ourselves now, if an ironist is unconcerned 
with external forces when it comes to self creation, aren‘t we 
affirming a metaphysical transcendent? It seems like in affirming 
the individualization of the self, atomization, we are falling into a 
pitfall where self-hood is no longer questionable. The ironist is a 
deconstructionist on many fronts, he is able to laugh at his own 
final vocabulary and assert its meaningfulness, but at the same 
time he is on a particular side of the metaphysical pole, a side 
which his heroes like Nietzsche and Heidegger are antithetical: the 
subject-object distinction. In a post-metaphysical society, it is 
unclear how Rorty can possibly start with a metaphysical claim: 
the self exists. As this claim is part of a justification of the 
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public/private distinction, and because as an anti-metaphysician the 
ironist can reject this premise, it is hard to see why all ironists 
might adhere to it.  
Another worry about the ironist position is that in adhering 
to a strict privatization of ironists, is one raised by Daniel Conway. 
If we are to privatize the ironists‘ pursuits, we necessarily force 
him into an anti-social hermetic existence. The liberal ironist is one 
whose liberalism comes before his ironism. As such, the ironist 
feels responsible not to influence the final vocabulary of others. 
But if the ironist is afraid of this notion, and he is unsure whether 
his language may or may not change the self describing actions of 
others, he might not have any reasons to perform acts of overt 
kindness. As Conway puts it, the ―liberal ironists thus double 
conserve themselves, sequestering themselves in the private sphere 
and ingesting moral edification that may prevent future 
expenditures of cruelty.‖4  
Rorty perhaps attempts to give us a way out of this. The 
liberal ironist, in his commitment to avert suffering, can attempt to 
understand the ways those who speak with different vocabularies 
might be humiliated. To do this he suggests the ironic liberal to 
study authors such as Nabokov and Orwell, authors who describe 
humiliation.  
Again, we might look at this sort of provision and evaluate 
whether the ironist is the sort of being we wish to encourage. In 
addition to his private self creation, the ironist is also compelled to 
study artistic works. He is committed to not only knowledge of 
                                                 
4
 Daniel Conway ―Taking Irony Seriously: Rorty's Postmetaphysical Liberalism,‖ 
American Literary History 3, no. 1 (1991): 200. 
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historical paradigms, but of an understanding of different types of 
cruelty. What sort of moral imperative is Rorty giving to the 
ironist? This seems to me to be a direct violation of the ironist‘s 
metaphysical aversion. Even privately the ironist is seen to be 
dominated by his political affiliation with liberalism. The ironist is 
committed to a form of hyper liberal asceticism. 
In his work, Rorty has attempted to give valid grounds for 
the promotion of ironists within our society. However, it seems 
that this characterization is good for neither liberals nor ironists. 
Though Rorty seeks to (furtively) increase the autonomy of the 
ironist, he implicates him in a life without a possibility for 
authentic self creation. The onus is placed upon the ironist himself 
to avert anti-liberal claims, whereas the liberal comes off scot free. 
As such, we would do good not to create a liberal society where a 
strong Rortian public/private distinction is honored.  
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